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Executive Summary
Proper waste disposal is difficult, especially when no one wants disposal facilities 
in his or her neighborhood. A sound waste management plan has to consider 
both environmental sustainability and the wishes of the local community. In 
Seoul’s case, it took two decades of efforts to develop consensus on building 
and operating incinerators in the Republic of Korea’s capital city to dispose of 
residents’ waste.
City officials held hundreds of open discussions to provide information on 
waste disposal and to listen to local residents’ concerns. Incorporating citizens’ 
demands, the government introduced stringent standards for pollutant emissions 
and related control systems, and it provided compensation to residents in the 
affected residential areas. At the same time that it built incinerators to dispose 
of the city’s trash, the government introduced new energy and recycling policies 
that made energy production more efficient and reduced waste generation. 
Those policies made residents’ heating and electricity bills more affordable and 
reduced the total amount of waste the city had to dispose of.
Between 1991 and 2005, the city built four waste incineration facilities located 
in areas that collectively housed about 13,000 residents. The facilities operate 
harmoniously within those communities under the voluntary watch of residents. 
By 2013, the incinerators processed almost 80 percent of Seoul’s nonrecyclable 
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municipal waste—a dramatic change compared with the 
late 1980s, when more than 90 percent of the city’s waste 
was dumped in a single landfill site. 
Introduction 
From 1960 to 1990, Korea experienced rapid 
industrialization and urbanization, inducing many 
citizens to move from other parts of the country to Seoul, 
the capital city. Seoul’s population more than quadrupled 
in those three decades, growing from 2.4  million to 
10.6 million. That population growth, combined with a fast 
increase in national income and changes in consumption 
patterns, caused a steep increase in municipal waste. 
Until the late 1970s, Seoul had no designated waste 
disposal sites, and municipal waste accumulated in 
residential properties and wastelands. To combat the 
problem, Seoul’s government opened the city’s first 
landfill in 1978. The landfill filled up faster than expected, 
however, and by 1986 it was over capacity.
The landfill was located on Nanji Island, a floodplain 
downstream of the Han River that flows through the heart 
of Seoul, and it was a blight on the city’s landscape. Not 
only was the Nanji landfill unpleasant to look at, but also 
it caused negative environmental effects, such as water 
contamination, foul odors, and the release of harmful 
gases. Environmental watchdogs raised the alarm, and 
many residents complained about the landfill and the 
problems it caused. 
Against the backdrop of the public outcry, the central 
government built a new landfill site in Gimpo, on the 
outskirts of Seoul, and introduced a series of waste 
management policies focused on waste reduction.1 The 
Seoul city government launched its first recycling system 
in 1978, and the national government followed with its 
own policy three years later. Few citizens recycled their 
waste, however, until the national government introduced 
its volume-based waste fee policy in 1995. This new 
policy was based on the “polluter pays” principle, and it 
required households and small businesses to dispose of 
any nonrecyclable waste in designated bags purchased 
from local governments (Kim 2019). 
1 This new landfill in Gimpo, officially named the Sudokwon (metropolitan) 
landfill site, has treated waste from Seoul and its surrounding metropolitan area 
(Incheon and Gyeonggi Province) since February 10, 1992. 
Increased recycling rates meant less total waste to 
dispose of, but even so, some unrecyclable waste still 
had be dealt with. Policy makers began looking into the 
most efficient, safe, and sustainable way of disposing of 
waste using the two options available to them: landfills 
and incinerators. 
Which of those two methods works best in a given 
situation depends largely on the economic and geographic 
conditions of the area. Jae-hyo Lee, a researcher at the 
Seoul Metropolitan Council, said incinerators were often 
a better option for countries such as Korea and especially 
for megacities such as Seoul, where the population is 
heavily concentrated in a limited and expensive land 
area.2 Incineration reduces the total volume of waste, and 
an incinerator’s operation period is longer than that of a 
landfill. Moreover, the heat produced during incineration 
can be used as a source of energy, and the adverse 
environmental effects of incineration can be reduced 
by using pollution mitigation equipment to process 
the harmful substances (such as hydrogen chloride, 
sulfur oxide, nitrogen oxide, dust, dioxins, and heavy 
metals) that are released in the combustion gas that the 
incinerators generate.
When Haewon Lee took office as the mayor of 
Seoul at the beginning of 1991, his administration laid 
out a blueprint for a new waste management policy 
through its Basic Waste Treatment Plan, which included 
a transition from landfills to incineration (Seoul 
Metropolitan Government 1991). To inform its plan, the 
government consulted with countries that were facing 
waste management problems similar to those in Korea, 
such as Japan and some Western European countries. 
The government noticed that many countries favored 
a transition from landfills to incinerators and “waste 
to energy” as a technological solution for overall waste 
disposal (European Commission 2005; Japanese Ministry 
of the Environment 2014; Shabecoff 1987). The waste-
to-energy idea of using the heat from incinerators as 
a source of district heating appealed to government 
officials, especially because it could be linked with urban 
development plans. There was high interest in energy 
efficiency after the first and second oil shocks in the 
1970s and the restrictions on using coal briquettes that 
the government introduced in the 1980s. According to 
Woong-gi Song, the municipal government’s chief of 
waste facilities at the time, the advantages of incineration 
2 Author interview with Jae-hyo Lee, Seoul, April 2, 2019.
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observed in other countries were the main driver of the 
policy transition.3  
To use thermal energy for district heating, the central 
government had renovated the Seoul Thermal Power 
Plant in 1987 as a cogeneration facility of combined 
heat and power. Building on that push for more efficient 
district heating, the Basic Waste Treatment Plan called 
for the government to build 11 incinerators at the same 
locations as district heating facilities, thereby allowing 
the city to turn its waste into energy. Although any waste 
that was not incinerable (such as hazardous materials 
and the ash from the incinerators) would still have to be 
sent to landfills, the new plan had the potential to reduce 
the overall landfilled waste by almost 85 percent.
Building and operating waste management facilities 
often upsets local residents, mainly because of concerns 
about negative health impacts caused by pollution 
generated during the treatment process. Seoul was not 
an exception; the plan to build incinerators faced intense 
opposition.
Delivery Challenges
The citizens of Seoul had witnessed the environmental 
problems caused by the Nanji landfill site and were also 
concerned about the harmful health effects of dioxins, 
which are highly toxic chemical compounds that can be 
produced during burning. Dioxins had become a major 
global health concern after Vietnam War veterans who 
were exposed to the dioxin-containing herbicide known 
as Agent Orange began to show side effects in the late 
1970s. Dioxins can stay in the human body for several 
decades and can disturb reproductive organs and the 
immune system.4 News that the incinerators could emit 
dioxins spread quickly among Seoul’s residents, and 
they organized an anti-incinerator movement when the 
government made public its plans to build incinerators.
Expecting some opposition to the plan, in early 1991 
the government began hosting town hall meetings in the 
neighborhoods where it planned to build incinerators. At 
the meetings, officials explained details of the proposed 
plan in an effort to dispel inaccurate information 
circulating among local communities. However, the 
scale of the opposition was much larger than anticipated. 
3 Author interview with Woong-gi Song, Seoul, April 2, 2019. 
4 For more details on dioxins and their effects on human health, see WHO (2016).
Although the government hosted more than a dozen 
meetings in each neighborhood of the first two proposed 
incinerator sites between 1991 and 1992, it made little 
headway in gaining the trust of the residents, and the 
conflict only intensified. Although residents understood 
the need for new waste disposal facilities, they did not 
budge an inch because of remaining health concerns. 
Thousands of residents squatted on the construction 
sites, protesting day and night. The demonstrations went 
on for as long as 34 consecutive days, and some residents 
even held nude protests. Protestors also formed a human 
chain to confine the officials to the protest sites until those 
officials backed down on their plans. “I felt threatened,” 
recalled Song, who was confronted by protestors at 
several of the meetings. On numerous occasions, protests 
turned violent, with protestors destroying facilities and 
throwing stones at officials. As the situation worsened, 
the central government intervened by sending 5,000 riot 
police officers to protect the two sites. 
The biggest challenge for the government was to 
gain the trust of protesting citizens and bring them to 
the negotiating table. Engaging the residents in dialogue 
required persistent persuasion based on the objective 
assessment of environmental effects. The government 
realized that an effective communication strategy would 
accelerate the negotiation process to facilitate the talks 
and to acknowledge the residents’ demands while 
preserving the policy’s objectives.
Tracing the Implementation 
Process
Getting Residents on Board and 
Building the First Incinerator
The mayor created a new office, dubbed “waste 
headquarters,” and tasked it with developing plans to 
generate as much thermal energy as possible while 
keeping pollution levels low to ensure the safety of local 
residents. The mayor’s office named the incineration 
facilities “resource recovery facilities” because they 
were designed to recover thermal energy from the mass 
burning of solid waste. “We also wanted to dilute the 
negative impression the residents had about incinerators 
by emphasizing that they could actually give back energy,” 
said Gi-choon Kim, a section chief at waste headquarters 
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at the time.5 The facilities aimed to produce electricity 
by using the heat created during the process of burning 
waste. The process would supply high-pressure steam for 
district heating.6
The plan to build 11 incineration facilities for Seoul’s 
22 districts, with 2 or 3 districts sharing each facility, did 
not come to fruition.7 Initially, the government was able 
to move forward with its plans at only three sites, all of 
which had been bought between 1977 and 1986 as part 
of a new urban development plan.8 Song said, “Selection 
of [the first] three sites in Yangcheon, Nowon, and 
Gangnam districts was possible only because they had 
been announced [when] the government bought the sites 
during the 1970s and 1980s under the former mayors’ 
tentative plans to build incinerators, long before public 
concerns arose.” 
As the debate over the incinerators continued, public 
broadcasters in Korea began reporting on incinerators 
in operation around the globe. After seeing the prime-
time coverage of incinerators in developed countries 
and hearing interviews with residents who lived near 
the facilities overseas, citizens in Seoul slowly began to 
temper their distrust of the government’s claims. “The 
major media coverage  .  .  . was a huge relief because it 
added objectivity to our claim,” said Song. In line with 
the media’s effort to deliver accurate information, the 
government sponsored field trips for residents to visit the 
foreign incineration facilities.
In Yangcheon, where the government began to 
construct its first resource recovery facility in December 
1992, the government and the residents reached a 
consensus reflecting residents’ demands in 1993. The 
government agreed to double the height of the facility’s 
chimney from 75 meters to 150 meters, to develop green 
spaces, to construct a 3,000-square-meter community 
center, and to subsidize heating costs for local residents. 
That agreement laid the foundation for enacting the 
Promotion of Installation of Waste Disposal Facilities 
and Assistance to Adjacent Areas Act in 1995, which 
required the government to support residents near the 
facilities to promote their welfare. Construction of the 
Yangcheon facility was completed in February 1996. The 
5 Author interview with Gi-choon Kim, Seoul, April 2, 2019.
6 Details of the facilities can be found at their official website, http://rrf.seoul.
go.kr/.
7 There were 22 administrative districts in Seoul from 1987 to 1995; the number 
increased to 25 on March 1, 1995.
8 For more details on the new urban development plan, see Yoo (2015).
facility had two incinerators, each with the capacity to 
incinerate 200 tonnes of waste per day.
Additional site selection became increasingly difficult, 
especially after Seoul began choosing district chiefs 
by direct election in 1995. Previously, district chiefs 
had been appointed by the mayor. After the change, 
candidates running for the district chief position became 
more sensitive to the negative public sentiment about the 
incinerator issue. 
Eventually, a fourth incinerator site, in Mapo district, 
was approved after proactive efforts from the district chief 
at the time. “He was really enthusiastic about convincing 
his residents of the potential benefits [of having an 
incinerator in the district], and even sponsored field trips 
to incinerators in developed countries,” said Song. 
Constructing Additional Incinerators 
and Fulfilling Residents’ Demands
As citizens realized that the construction of incinerators 
was inevitable, they began using a two-track strategy 
of (a) demonstrations to keep pressure on the mayor 
and the National Assembly and (b) negotiations with 
government officials to resolve health concerns and 
demand compensation. “We could not stop, because we 
could not risk our children’s health,” recalled one resident 
who lived in a neighborhood close to the Yangcheon 
facility.9 
The construction of the Nowon facility started at 
about the same time as that of the Yangcheon facility, in 
1992. However, it took an additional year—until January 
1997—to complete the work at Nowon. The Gangnam 
facility took seven years to build, from December 1994 to 
December 2001. 
While the administration negotiated with residents, 
the legislative body of the Seoul Metropolitan Council 
enacted ordinances to engage citizens and to decide on 
appropriate compensation for people who lived near the 
proposed sites. The ordinances, which passed in January 
1996, called for the formation of a citizens’ committee for 
each facility. The committees encouraged local residents 
to engage in the governance of the facilities and helped 
the government devise compensation that fit local 
residents’ demands. 
The ordinances also mandated the government to 
create community support funds to finance compensation 
9 Author interview with local resident, Seoul, April 12, 2019.
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for affected communities. The compensation included 
heating cost exemptions, housing subsidies and home 
improvement programs, and welfare assistance for 
residents.10 Both municipal government and districts 
contributed to the funds. In the community support 
funds, the amount allocated for each committee 
depended on the amount of waste the facility disposed of. 
When the council introduced heating cost exemption 
benefits, the policy immediately proved popular among 
residents because it significantly reduced their cost of 
living. The heating cost exemption played an instrumental 
role in bringing the two sides to an agreement. “If the 
facilities had not been designed to produce electricity 
and power for heating so that city could provide heating 
cost exemptions as an incentive for residents, we would 
have not reached an agreement,” Song said. 
Local residents independently managed the 
community support funds. “Some communities 
started covering the monthly maintenance cost of their 
apartment complexes with the fund, and local residents 
were very happy,” said Byeong-woon Tak, the head of the 
Nowon committee.11 “Most of the residents living in [the 
areas near the Nowon incinerator facility] were young 
couples. They did not want to move to other areas; they 
preferred to stay where they were and raise their kids. 
Daycares and kindergartens moved into those areas and 
they became some of the most child-friendly and popular 
places [to live],” he said. 
Seoul’s government built and operated community 
centers next to each facility to improve the residential 
environments. The centers had gyms, swimming pools, 
libraries, classrooms, and concert halls that were used 
for various community and extracurricular activities. All 
the centers offered discounted rates for residents of the 
affected areas. 
In 2000, the government began conducting annual 
health screenings of residents of the affected areas in 
collaboration with Yonsei University Hospital. That year 
and every year following, the hospital conducted studies 
on the health effects of the facilities by randomly selecting 
80 to 100 residents in the affected area of each resource 
recovery facility and screening them for health issues. 
As demanded by the residents, Seoul’s government 
made significant changes to its initial plan during the 
10 The affected areas were defined as residences within 300 meters of each; they 
totaled 12,537 households (3,413 households in Yangcheon, 6,190 households in 
Nowon, 2,934 households in Gangnam, and none in Mapo). 
11 Author interview with Byeong-woon Tak, Seoul, April 16, 2019.
construction period. Those changes reduced the number 
of facilities and each facility’s individual capacity. The 
capacities of the facilities in Nowon and Gangnam were 
reduced by half from what was originally planned. The 
incineration capacity of the Nowon facility was reduced 
from 1,600 to 800 tonnes of trash per day, and the capacity 
of the Gangnam facility was reduced from 1,800 to 900 
tonnes. For both facilities, the adjustment took place in 
the middle of the construction stage, which necessitated 
redesigning the facilities. 
To prevent such inefficiency, the government waited 
until it had an agreement with local residents on the 
capacity of the Mapo facility before selecting a company 
to construct the incinerators. Through negotiations 
with the local community, the government adjusted the 
planned capacity of the Mapo facility four times before 
finally settling on a capacity of 750 tonnes of waste per 
day, a large reduction from the originally planned capacity 
of 2,700 tonnes per day (Lee 2009). Because construction 
did not begin until the negotiations were complete, the 
construction time for the Mapo facility was shorter 
than that of the other facilities. Construction began in 
December 2001, and its three 250-tonne incinerators 
were completed in May 2005. When Mapo, the final 
facility, was complete, there were 4 resource recovery 
facilities operating in Seoul, a big reduction from the 11 
facilities the government had originally planned to build.
During the negotiation process, some committees 
made temporary agreements with the government, 
some of which contained language stating that the 
facilities would accept waste only from the local district. 
Although the government pushed for the facilities to 
accept waste from neighboring districts as well, residents 
were strongly opposed to this change. As a result, the first 
three facilities built accepted waste only from their own 
districts. Other districts’ waste went to the landfill, along 
with the ash from the incinerators and any waste that 
could not be incinerated because of the type and toxicity 
of the material. The Mapo facility, however, treated waste 
from three neighboring districts following an agreement 
made with the community and district chief in 1997.
Expanding the Reach of the New 
Facilities
The resulting treatment capacity totaled only about 17 
percent of the initial 11-facility plan and 44 percent of the 
adjusted 4-facility plan (a daily capacity of 2,850 tonnes 
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compared with the initial 16,500 tonnes and the adjusted 
6,500 tonnes). Despite the huge reduction in capacity, 
the Seoul government was able to manage its municipal 
waste by implementing waste reduction policies such 
as those governing the volume-based waste fee system, 
recycling facilities, and recycling of food garbage. With 
the combined policies at work, the overall municipal 
waste generated fell far below the amount that had been 
projected in the early 1990s. 
The huge decrease in waste generation had an 
unintended side effect: a low level of use at the resource 
recovery facilities. For example, the Yangcheon facility 
was designed to accept 400 tonnes of waste from the 
Yangcheon area per day. However, the actual amount of 
waste generated in the area amounted to only 212 tonnes 
per day in 2002, about half of the facility’s total capacity. 
The actual amount of waste in the Nowon area was 
only one-quarter of its facility’s treatment capacity, and 
in Gangnam, the waste was only one-third. The Mapo 
facility, the only facility that treated the waste of multiple 
districts, operated at 60 percent of its treatment capacity. 
The combined operation rates remained at about one-
third of the total treatment capacity until 2005. 
Operating so far below capacity sometimes caused 
equipment to malfunction. When that happened, waste 
had to be sent to the landfill site 45 kilometers away from 
the city. Having to transport waste to the landfill created 
additional costs for the government. Those issues cost 
the government ₩10 billion (about US$8.8 million at the 
time) annually, according to Lee (2009).
The government had recognized the problems in 2001, 
when it began meeting with the citizens’ committees at 
the Yangcheon, Nowon, and Gangnam facilities to try 
to persuade residents to accept waste from neighboring 
districts. The process of getting the committees to 
consent was tough; vigorous demonstrations ensued. 
One major problem was that early agreements between 
the government and the committees had clauses such as 
“not to accept waste from other districts,” which made 
it seem to residents as though the government was not 
sticking to its original promises. In total, the government 
held 450 meetings with the committees between 2001 
and 2010 to try to reach agreements on accepting waste 
from neighboring districts.
Much of the negotiations revolved around adjusting 
compensatory benefits. For example, both parties agreed 
to increase the fee charged for waste from neighboring 
districts, a fee that accumulated in the community support 
funds for the local residents. The city council revised the 
ordinance to reflect the deliberations. First, the revised 
ordinance gave residents living within 300 meters of the 
facility a discount of up to 70 percent on their electric 
bills. In Yangcheon, the committee agreed to charge 
two neighboring districts, Gangseo and Yeongdeungpo, 
₩21,000 (about US$17 at the time) for every tonne of 
waste and to subsidize living expenses for 3,413 affected 
households (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2014). 
The Nowon committee received ₩30,000 (about US$25 
at the time) per five tonnes of waste, a quarter of which 
was used to improve the residential environment for 
the 6,190 affected households. Some districts agreed to 
exchange different types of waste to be treated at facilities 
in other districts. For example, Nowon district agreed to 
incinerate waste from Dobong district in exchange for 
Dobong accepting Nowon’s food waste. (The food waste 
treatment facility was located in Dobong.)
The committees also requested that the government 
replace the facilities’ pollution prevention and monitoring 
equipment to better control dioxin emissions. In 
addition, the agreement made the emission standards of 
air pollutants 10 times more stringent than the national 
standard. The government monitored the air pollutants 
discharged from the facilities 24 hours a day through 
an automatic measurement system. The pollutant levels 
were posted in real time on an electric sign board outside 
the facility and on the government website. Pollutant 
levels that could not be measured in real time were posted 
on the website when they became available, which was 
three months after the measurements were taken. The 
government hired independent organizations to conduct 
additional measurements to ensure objectivity. 
Residents were proactive in monitoring the waste 
that went to their local facilities. Six times each month, 
a voluntary group of three residents from each facility’s 
district visited each neighboring district that sent waste 
to their facility to monitor the waste being sent. If the 
monitoring group found any inappropriate waste, such 
as food waste or toxic materials, it could issue a warning 
and ban the district in question from sending waste to 
the facility for one week. The fees collected from the user 
districts covered the cost of the monitoring activities, 
including the printing of warning stickers that volunteers 
put on improperly disposed of waste bags. According 
to Tak, the monitoring groups “improved the quality of 
waste and reduced overall pollution while promoting 
active resident participation.” 
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It took several years of negotiations for each committee 
and the government to reach an agreement on accepting 
waste from neighboring districts. The Gangnam facility 
started admitting waste from neighboring districts in 
May 2007, after having 160 meetings over five years. It 
took six years and 100 meetings before the Nowon facility 
began to accept neighboring districts’ waste in July 2007.12 
Although the Mapo facility, the last of the four, planned to 
treat waste from three districts from its inception, it still 
took 40 meetings over a year to reach an agreement on the 
terms. In the Yangcheon facility, an agreement was finally 
reached in 2010 after 150 meetings over nine years.13 See 
figure 1 for the locations and coverage of the facilities.
Outcomes
Despite the not-in-my-backyard activism that involved 
hundreds of complaints and numerous violent protests, 
Seoul’s government was able to reach agreements on 
the construction of four new incineration facilities 
and come to mutually beneficial agreements with local 
communities. The efforts to appease public health 
concerns yielded more stringent standards and controls 
12 Nowon and Gangnam each added one district, in February 2012 (Dongdaemun) 
and May 2013 (Gwanak), respectively, which increased the number of user 
districts to 22 by May 2013. 
13 The agreements between the Seoul government and each committee were 
reached on the following dates: May 7, 2007, in Gangnam; June 30, 2007, in 
Nowon; February 10, 2009, in Mapo; and May 10, 2010, in Yangcheon.
on pollutant emissions. As the government promised the 
residents, the levels of pollutants discharged from the 
facilities were maintained at a much lower level than the 
standards. During the early operation period between 
1996 and 2005, new legislation was also introduced 
for participatory governance and compensation for 
residents.
The Seoul government had to bear the costs of operating 
the facilities well below capacity during their first years in 
operation. However, the facilities began to recover when 
they managed to convince residents to accept waste from 
multiple districts beginning in 2005. Adding more user 
districts drove a dramatic increase in operation rates (see 
figure 2). Operation rates were low until 2005, when more 
districts began using the facilities. By 2012, the number 
of districts sending waste to the facilities increased to 21 
(out of 25 total districts in Seoul), and one more district 
was added in 2013. Of the remaining three districts, just 
one sent its waste to the landfill. One sent its waste to 
a neighboring province, and one had its own district 
incineration facility (which operated autonomously from 
the Seoul government).
When the facilities began accepting waste from 
multiple districts, Seoul significantly decreased the 
amount of waste it sent to its landfill. In 1991, 30,000 
tonnes per day went to the landfill. By 2012, that figure 
was only 700 tonnes per day. By sending less waste to the 
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landfill, the government saved on transportation costs 
and extended the life of the landfill by at least a decade.14 
The incinerators increased the city’s energy generation 
capacity and provided thousands of houses with heating 
at reduced cost. By 2012, the energy generated by the 
Yangcheon facility covered 16 percent of the heating 
for 140,000 homes in the area. The facilities’ energy 
coverage for heating reached 23 percent in Nowon and 
27 percent in Gangnam, for 128,000 and 176,000 homes, 
respectively. The Mapo facility covered 57 percent of the 
heating for 70,000 homes from its energy (see Yoo 2015). 
Lessons Learned
Linking Waste Management and 
Energy Production
During the planning stages to implement the Basic Waste 
Treatment Plan, the government’s decision to link the 
installation of incinerators with urban development plans 
added justification for site selection and the shift in policy 
away from landfills. Because one of the major objectives 
of the policy was to use heat from the incinerators for 
district heating, the location of the incinerators had to 
match the location of the district heating facilities. By 
linking those plans, the government was able to promote 
the benefits of having an incinerator facility in the 
neighborhood, and the heating cost exemption benefit 
worked as a trump card in the negotiation process with 
residents.
Complementing Waste Disposal 
Policies with Waste Reduction Policies
While the incinerator facilities were being built, the 
government introduced the volume-based waste fee 
system and other recycling policies that resulted in a 
reduction in the amount of waste being produced city-
wide. That reduction made it possible for the government 
to agree to citizens’ demands to have lower-capacity 
facilities and later made it easier for the government to 
convince residents to accept waste from neighboring 
districts at their local facilities. The community support 
fund depended on the amount of waste treated at the 
14 At the beginning of its operation in 1992, the Sudokwon (metropolitan) landfill 
site in Gimpo was estimated to run out of space by 2016. As a result of successful 
reduction of waste, however, the site extended its operation to 2025 and reserved 
room for an additional extension that is under discussion. 
facilities, and as waste generation decreased, the local 
residents needed to accept more waste from neighboring 
districts to sustain the funding they received.
Building Trust with Citizens
Public health concerns raised by citizens were reasonable, 
and the government had an obligation to resolve the 
issues. Although the government had anticipated such 
concerns and prepared for open discussions through 
consultation sessions, the low level of trust in the 
government hindered any dialogue. The government 
slowly built trust with residents through transparency 
and by fulfilling its commitments. The government 
published every step of its plan and made environmental 
assessments from both government institutions and 
independent institutions public, which verified the claims 
the government made. Medical checkups and a visible 
display of the pollutants produced by the facilities gave 
the residents a sense of security. “[Now], the residents in 
the affected areas are not as worried about their health 
effects, especially after observing no significant changes 
in their health condition for the last twenty years,” said 
Tak, the head of the Nowon committee. The government 
also raised the facilities’ emission standards and replaced 
equipment at the facilities as the residents demanded. 
The transparency and response to residents’ concerns 
were key in quelling the protest movement and keeping 
citizens at the negotiating table.
Engaging Citizens through 
Participatory Governance
Having a committee formed of the residents’ 
representatives and professionals enabled residents to 
voice their demands more directly. This participatory 
governance mechanism gave the residents leverage 
to ask for compensatory benefits that fit their needs, 
which included heating cost exemptions, subsidies 
for rent and maintenance, and discounts for the use of 
community centers. The committees received funding 
from the city government and fees for accepting waste 
from neighboring districts. The financial support for 
the committees encouraged their activities, including 
voluntary monitoring of the waste being treated at their 
local facilities.
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